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SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA, PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY KIGALI, PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA, PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA, PRIORITY
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SECDEF WASHDC//OASD (SOLIC) HRA-OPS//
SECDEF WASHDC//SOLIC:HRA//
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AND AID/PPC
STATE FOR PRM/AAA, AF/E, AF/C, MGRW02, PM/ISP, IO/PHO,
IO/ESA, AND DRL/AAA
BUJUMBURA PASS DART
KIGALI PASS DART
NAIROBI PASS DART, REDSO/FFPO, REFCOORD AND SOMALIA
KAMPALA PASS WISE AND BEIK
ROME FOR FODAG

GENEVA FOR RMA
LONDON FOR YOUNG
LUANDA FOR TOOLEY
ADDIS ABABA PASS OFDA REGIONAL OFFICE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREF, PREL, PHUM, BAID, MOPS, RW, TZ

SUBJECT: TANZANIAN REFUGEE EMERGENCY GROWS

REF: A. DAR ES SALAAM 05357 B. NAIROBI 15457

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INTRODUCTION: U.S. MISSION/DAR ES SALAAM SEES A GRIM
PICTURE WITH FEW PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT

1. AMBASSADOR ANDERSON AND USAID DIRECTOR WENTLING UNDERTOOK A MISSION TO THE KAGERA REGION OF TANZANIA FROM OCTOBER 3 TO 7 TO LEARN FIRST HAND OF THE CHALLENGES FACING RWANDAN/BURUNDI REFUGEES AND RELIEF WORKERS. THIS FIVE-DAY TRIP ALLOWED THIS U.S. MISSION/DAR ES SALAAM TEAM TO SEE ALMOST ALL REFUGEE SITES IN THE NGARA AND KARAGWE DISTRICTS AND TO DISCUSS AT LENGTH THE REFUGEE SITUATION WITH KEY UN, NGO AND LOCAL TANZANIAN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. THE TEAM WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL BY AIR AND ROAD EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THESE TWO DISTRICTS. THIS INCLUDED GAINING GOOD AERIAL VIEWS OF MOST REFUGEE CAMPS AND THE RWANDAN SIDE OF THE BORDER. ON OCTOBER 6, THE TEAM JOINED UP WITH SENIOR USAID FOOD FOR PEACE OFFICERS FROM WASHINGTON AND ROME, WHO TRAVELED FROM BUJUMBURA WITH USAID/BURUNDI PERSONNEL, FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH WFP AND UNHCR REPS ON THE FOOD CRISIS FACING THE CAMPS.

2. THE OVERALL FINDING OF THE TRIP WAS THAT THE REFUGEE SITUATION BECOMES GRIMMER WITH EACH PASSING DAY AS FOOD, WATER, HEALTH/SANITATION, SHELTER, FIREWOOD AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR A CONSTANTLY GROWING REFUGEE POPULATION BEGIN TO SURPASS THE ABILITY OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS (HRO) TO SATISFY THEM. THIS REPORT, WHICH FOLLOWS UP ON OUR PREVIOUS AUGUST 24 REPORT (REF A), AND SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF PRM (REF B) AND OFDA (REF C), REITERATES THE INCREASING GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND CALLS FOR URGENT ACTION TO HELP PREVENT FURTHER CHAOS IN THIS PART OF TANZANIA.

OVERVIEW: WAGING A LOSING BATTLE AGAINST MOUNTING ODDS

3. BASICALLY, THERE ARE JUST TOO MANY REFUGEES (527,450 ON OCTOBER 10) IN TOO FEW PLACES, TOO CLOSE TOGETHER AND TOO CLOSE TO THE BORDER, AND THERE ARE STILL TOO MANY ARRIVING EACH DAY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO TALK OF REPATRIATION AND STABILIZING CAMP CONDITIONS UNTIL THE HEAVY INFLUX, OVER 1,000 PER DAY FOR OVER TWO MONTHS, IS STOPPED. THE UNRESOLVED ETHNIC CONFLICT IN BURUNDI AND RWANDA, THE ARRIVAL IN RWANDA OF THOUSANDS OF FOREIGN TUTSIS FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND THE PRESENCE OF A GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI BACKED BY THE TUTSI MILITARY LEAVE FEW, IF ANY, VIABLE OPTIONS OPEN FOR THE HUTU REFUGEES. RESETTLEMENT FURTHER INSIDE TANZANIA CONTINUES TO BE AN UNLIKELY OPTION BUT IT MERITS GREATER CONSIDERATION. CURRENT UNHCR PLANNING IS LOOKING AT AN ASSUMPTION THAT NO MORE THAN 10% OF THE HUTU REFUGEES WILL RETURN TO THEIR HOME AREAS WITHIN THE NEXT THREE YEARS. THIS IS A LONG-TERM PROBLEM WHICH REQUIRES A FAR-REACHING REGIONAL STRATEGY THAT HAS THE SOLID BACKING OF THE U.N. AND OAU AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALL COUNTRIES CONCERNED. CLOSING THE UNSUSTAINABLE CAMPS IN TANZANIA WOULD ONLY BE ONE IMPORTANT PART OF THIS STRATEGY.

4. DESPITE THE PRAISEWORTHY EFFORTS OF HRO'S A LOSING BATTLE IS BEING WAGED AGAINST MULTIPLE, INTERRELATED AND GROWING EMERGENCY SITUATIONS WITHIN THE CAMPS. FOOD IS ALREADY IN SHORT SUPPLY AND MAINTAINING THE FOOD PIPELINE DOES NOT LOOK POSSIBLE. THE FATAL FOOD GAP REPORTED REF (A) HAS OCCURRED AND MOST CAMPS HAVE BEEN GETTING HALF-RATIONS (900 CALS PER PERSON) FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. OUT OF DESPERATION, UNHCR IS TAKING THE UNUSUAL STEP OF SPENDING UP TO DOLS 800,000 TO PROCURE FOOD LOCALLY, THEREBY GRAVELY DISTORTING THE LOCAL MARKET, WHILE WFP/DAR IS HUSTLING TO ACCELERATE THE DELIVERY OF RECENTLY ARRIVED FOOD COMMODITIES. HOWEVER, FOOD ON HAND AND IN THE PIPELINE REPRESENTS ONLY ABOUT A 35-DAY SUPPLY. MUCH MORE FOOD WILL BE NEEDED TO KEEP UP WITH EVEN THE CURRENT REFUGEE CONSUMPTION RATE OF 10,000 MT PER MONTH. IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER OR NOT SUCH HIGH QUANTITY OF NEEDED FOOD AID CAN BE SUPPLIED ON A CONSISTENT BASIS.

5. AVAILABLE WATER IN MOST CAMPS IS LESS THAN HALF THE RECOMMENDED LEVEL OF 20 LITERS PER PERSON/DAY AND THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING ADEQUATE GROUND WATER IS PRECLUDING THE OPENING OF NEW SITES. BENACO AND CHABILISSA CAMP RESIDENTS GET UNDER 5 LITERS A DAY AND

OFTEN WAIT IN LINES FOR WATER MORE THAN FOUR HOURS. THE LACK OF GROUND WATER MADE UNHCR DECIDE THIS WEEK TO ABANDON EFFORTS TO COMPLETE WORK ON THE NEW OMUKIRIRO SITE. THIS IS A REAL SETBACK AND MEANS MORE OVERCROWDING IN EXISTING CAMPS IN THE KARAGWE DISTRICT AND THE POSSIBLE ISOLATION OF THESE CAMPS AS HEAVY RAINFALL MAKES ROAD ACCESS MORE DIFFICULT (THE INCREASED USE OF THE ROADS BY RELIEF VEHICLES IS ALSO ADDING TO A DECLINE IN ROAD CONDITIONS).

6. A SIMILAR WATER PROBLEM HAS STOPPED RELOCATION OF BENACIOIANS TO THE ADJOINING MUSUHURA HILL SITE AND MAY ALSO PREVENT THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW, ADJOINING NYANGAGONGA HILL SITE. UNHCR IS DEVELOPING A LONGER-TERM WATER RESOURCE PLAN WHICH INVOLVES PUMPING WATER OVER SOME DISTANCE FROM THE KAGERA OR RUVUMU RIVERS. THIS WOULD TAKE NINE MONTHS TO CONSTRUCT AND THE ESTIMATED COST WOULD BE DOLS 5 MILLION. BESIDES THE COST AND COMPLEXITY OF SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, IT WOULD PROBABLY MEET WITH RESISTANCE FROM GOT OPPONENTS OF REFUGEE "PERMANENCY" IN THE REGION. MEANWHILE, THE TRANSFER OF TWO UNAMIR WATER PURIFICATION UNITS AND WATER TANKERS FROM KIGALI WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP.

7. GENERALLY, THE CRUDE MORTALITY RATE IS ABOVE THE ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF 2 PER 10,000. THIS RATE IS EXPECTED TO GO UP AS THE RAINY SEASON PROGRESSES AND OVERCROWDING OF THE CAMPS INCREASES. THE SERIOUS LACK OF PLASTIC SHEETING FOR SHELTER WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASED MORTALITY AS THE STRAW HOVELS MANY REFUGEES LIVE IN WILL GIVE LITTLE PROTECTION AGAINST RAIN AND CHILLY WEATHER. PROBLEMS RELATED TO HEALTH/SANITATION, DISPOSAL OF HUMAN WASTE AND THE BURIAL IN SHALLOW GRAVES OF THE HUNDREDS OF DEAD EACH WEEK WILL ALSO MULTIPLY DURING THE OCTOBER-DECEMBER RAINY SEASON. THE INCREASED DIFFICULTY OF COLLECTING FIREWOOD, EVEN WITH THE MAXIMUM USE OF FUEL-EFFICIENT STOVES AND ALTERNATE FUELS SUCH AS PEAT, ADDS TO REFUGEE MISERY AND WEIGHS HEAVILY AGAINST THE MAINTENANCE OF CAMPS FOR MUCH MORE TIME IN THE SAME PLACES. THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF STD'S AND THE HIV VIRUS ADDS TO THE TERRIBLE TOLL ON REFUGEES AND THE LOCAL POPULATION AS WELL. THE BABY BOOM (OVER 12,000 BIRTHS EXPECTED IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS) THAT WILL START TO OCCUR IN THE DECEMBER-JANUARY PERIOD WILL FURTHER COMPLICATE THINGS.

8. THESE HARSH CONDITIONS SERVE TO UNDERMINE SECURITY BY INCREASING TENSIONS AND ENCOURAGING MILITANT ELEMENTS

WITHIN THE CAMPS TO UNDERTAKE VIOLENT ACTS AND CONSIDER ARMED EXCURSIONS INTO RWANDA. ALSO, A MORE DESPERATE REFUGEE POPULATION IS GENERATING AN INCREASE IN ANTAGONISMS WITH THE OUTNUMBERED LOCAL INHABITANTS. IN PARTICULAR, THE LARGE, GROSSLY OVERCROWDED BENACO CAMP (CITY) WITH OVER 275,000 REFUGEES IS LIKE A TIME BOMB WAITING TO EXPLODE AT ANY MOMENT. THE EXISTENCE OF MILITARY TRAINING WITHIN THE BENACO CAMP HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. THE OVERCROWDED CONDITIONS IN BENACO AND ITS SISTER CAMP CITY, LUMASI, WHICH SHOULD HIT THIS WEEK ITS MAXIMUM POPULATION OF 100,000, INCREASE THE POTENTIAL FOR ALL SORTS OF BAD NEWS. THE SAME APPLIES TO THE VERY TENSE CHABILISSA CAMP AND THEIR DIFFICULT TO MANAGE POPULATION OF JUST OVER 81,000. EVEN IN NOT SO CROWDED, SMALL (POP. ABOUT 13,000) CAMPS LIKE LUKOLE (THE SO-CALLED BURUNDI CAMP BECAUSE THIS IS WHERE HUTU REFUGEES FROM BURUNDI ARE LOCATED) BAD, INEXPLICABLE THINGS CAN HAPPEN LIKE THE MASS RAID AND THEFT OF AROUND 300 TENTS WHICH WAS PERPETRATED BY AN UNKNOWN GANG DURING THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 8 - 9. THE FRIGHTENING THING ABOUT SUCH CRIMINAL EPISODES IS THAT SO LITTLE CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT OR BRING THE GUILTY TO JUSTICE.

9. THE LIGHTLY-ARMED 50 TANZANIAN POLICEMEN IN THE REGION, OR EVEN THE ADDITIONAL, UNHCR-FUNDED 300 TANZANIAN POLICE EXPECTED BY THE END OF THE MONTH, ARE CERTAINLY NO MATCH FOR THE KIND OF MASSIVE UPHEAVAL THAT COULD OCCUR IN THE CAMPS. THERE IS NOTHING TO STOP THE THOUSANDS OF YOUNG MEN IN THE CAMPS FROM TAKING OVER AND WRECKING MAYHEM THROUGHOUT THE AREA. ALREADY THE CRIME RATE IS SKYROCKETING AND LOCAL JAILS ARE BULGING WITH THREE TIMES AS MANY PRISONERS AS THEY WERE DESIGNED TO HOLD. ALSO, WITNESS THE SEPTEMBER 29 INCIDENT WHERE THE DETAINMENT OF ONE PROMINENT HUTU PERSONAGE IN BENACO BY THE TANZANIAN POLICE LED TO THE ENGULFMENT OF THE POLICE STATION BY THOUSANDS OF YOUNG MEN WHICH GAVE THE POLICE (ADMITTEDLY, THE POLICE HANDLED THE SITUATION POORLY) NO CHOICE BUT TO RELEASE THIS REFUGEE NOTABLE. THIS VIVIDLY EXEMPLIFIES THE DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH TRYING TO EXTRACT ANYONE ACCUSED OF PARTICIPATING IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS FROM THE CAMPS. IT IS ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT THE TEAM COULD NOT VISIT THE CHABILISSA CAMP IN THE KARAGWE DISTRICT ON OCTOBER 5 BECAUSE OF UNREST RELATED TO FOOD SHORTAGES AND WAS SUBJECTED TO TWO BENACO SECURITY ALERTS WHILE STAYING IN NGARA. IF 50% FOOD RATIONS CAN CAUSE SUCH A DISTURBANCE IN CHABALISSA, WHAT WOULD THE ABSENCE OF ANY RATION DO? THE ANSWER TO THIS MAY BE KNOWN NEXT WEEK WHEN SOME CAMPS MAY NOT BENEFIT

FROM THE USUAL WEEKLY DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD.

10. THINGS ARE SOMEWHAT MORE TENSE IN THE KARAGWE DISTRICT AS MOST OF THE LOCAL INHABITANTS TRACE THEIR ANCESTRAL ORIGINS TO TUTSI FORBEARERS AND THE RPF IS REPORTED TO BE ACTIVELY WORKING ON THE RWANDA SIDE TO SEAL THE BORDER IN THIS MARSHLAND/BOG AREA. THE LONG-TERM PRESENCE OF SO MANY REFUGEES IN THIS AREA DEFINITELY REPRESENTS A DESTABILIZING ELEMENT. ALSO, MOST OF THE NEARLY 19,000 SO-CALLED TANZANIAN TUTSIS WHO HAVE CROSSED OVER INTO RWANDA IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS ORIGINATE FROM THIS AREA. MOST OF THESE "TUTSIS" WERE BORN IN TANZANIA AND HAVE NEVER SEEN RWANDA. IT IS OBVIOUS TO LOCAL TANZANIAN AUTHORITIES THAT THESE PEOPLE ARE MOSTLY GOING TO RWANDA AS THE RESULT OF A "TUTSI-RETURN" PROMOTION CAMPAIGN DIRECTED BY TUTSI LEADERS WITHIN RWANDA AND THE PROMISE OF LAND, HOUSES, ETC. THE PROBABLE OCCUPATION OF LAND AND HOUSES LEFT BY FLEEING HUTU REFUGEES BY THESE NEW, ENGLISH-SPEAKING TUTSI ARRIVALS IS VERY UNNERVING TO THE REFUGEE POPULATION AND MAKES REPATRIATION AND THE AVOIDANCE OF RENEWED ARMED CONFLICT MORE DIFFICULT.

RECOMMENDATIONS: SOME THINGS WORTH TRYING TO PREVENT
MORE HUMAN SUFFERING AND CHAOS OVER THE LONG-TERM

11. THE OVERALL SITUATION IS OVERWHELMING AND A BREAKDOWN IS INEVITABLE UNLESS A MUCH HIGHER LEVEL OF ATTENTION AND GREATER RESOURCES ARE BROUGHT TO BEAR WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. THE FOLLOWING FIVE AREAS OF ACTION ARE RECOMMENDED FOR IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION:

A. A HIGH LEVEL U.N. DELEGATION, PERHAPS WORKING IN CONCERT WITH THE OAU, SHOULD BE DISPATCHED IN SHORT ORDER TO THE REGION TO DETERMINE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS THE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN OVER THE NEAR AND MEDIUM-TERM TO ADDRESS THIS LONG-TERM REFUGEE PROBLEM. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TANZANIANS SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE IMMEDIATE NEED FOR MORE SITES FAR AWAY FROM THE BORDER FOR TRANSIT CAMPS AND, ALSO, THE PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT WITHIN TANZANIA OF THOSE REFUGEES WHO HAVE NO INTENTION OF RETURNING HOME. THIS DELEGATION SHOULD ALSO TRAVEL TO THE CAMPS TO HEAR AND RESPOND TO REFUGEE LEADER CONCERNS ABOUT FUTURE POLITICAL-MILITARY POWER SHARING ARRANGEMENTS, THE STATUS OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS, ETC.

(THESE WERE THEMES HEARD OVER AND OVER AGAIN BY THE TEAM IN THE CAMPS). IN DISCUSSIONS WITH GOT OFFICIALS THE DELEGATION MIGHT WANT TO ACCENT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOT TO DO ITS BEST TO ENSURE SECURITY ON THE TANZANIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER. (CURRENTLY, THE GOT HAS SADDLED UNHCR WITH SUPPORTING ALL THE COSTS OF THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF 300 ADDITIONAL TANZANIAN POLICEMEN TO THE KAGERA REGION.) THE RESULTS OF THESE MULTI-COUNTRY CONSULTATIONS SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE RWANDAN/BURUNDI REFUGEE PROBLEM IN THE SUBREGION.

B. THIS SAME DELEGATION, OR ANOTHER OF SIMILAR STATURE, SHOULD ALSO EVALUATE THE REASONS FOR THE CONTINUED HEAVY OUTFLOW OF HUTUS FROM RWANDA/BURUNDI INTO TANZANIA. DURING THE PAST WEEK THERE WAS AN UPSURGE OF NEW ARRIVALS, MOSTLY RWANDAN HUTUS BUT A GOOD NUMBER OF BURUNDI HUTUS TOO. IT IS THOUGHT THAT MANY OF THE 8,700 REFUGEES ARRIVING IN THE SEPTEMBER 30 - OCTOBER 6 PERIOD LEFT THE MUGANA CAMP IN BURUNDI BECAUSE OF LACK OF FOOD AND/OR HARASSMENT FROM THE BURUNDI MILITARY WHICH IS RUMORED TO BE WORKING IN COLLABORATION WITH THE RPF. THIS REPORT AND OTHERS REPORTS ON THE REASONS FOR THE CONTINUED EXODUS FROM RWANDA/BURUNDI NEED TO BE CHECKED AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ARMS-FREE, TROOPS-FREE "SAFE" ZONES ALONG THE BORDER INSIDE RWANDA AND BURUNDI NEEDS TO BE EXPLORED. THIS WILL BE NEEDED IF THE INFLUX OF REFUGEES IS TO BE STEMMED AND ADDITIONAL ROOM FOR REFUGEE SITES AND RESETTLEMENT IS TO BE ACQUIRED OUTSIDE TANZANIA, A COUNTRY WHICH IS VERY RELUCTANT TO CONTINUE ACCOMMODATING SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES. IN FACT, SOME GOT OFFICIALS ARE CALLING FOR THE CREATION OF SUCH "BUFFER" ZONES AT PLACES ALONG THE 293 KILOMETERS OF BORDER TANZANIA HAS WITH RWANDA AND BURUNDI.

C. A MEETING SHOULD BE CALLED IMMEDIATELY OF ALL KEY U.N., NGO, AND DONOR PERSONNEL INVOLVED WITH THE REFUGEE CRISIS TO DECIDE HOW COORDINATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE AMONG RELIEF AGENCIES WORKING IN THE SUBREGION CAN BE IMPROVED AND TO INITIATE THE PREPARATION OF AN OVERARCHING, LONG-TERM STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR ADDRESSING THE CRISIS. ALL ELEMENTS, --- HUMANITARIAN, POLITICAL AND SECURITY --- AFFECTING THE REFUGEE SITUATION SHOULD BE COVERED IN THIS STRATEGY. THIS MEETING SHOULD ALSO RESULT IN A DECISION ON THE PROCESS OF SELECTING AN OVERALL COORDINATOR AND COORDINATION MECHANISM FOR ALL ACTIONS EFFECTING THE

REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE SUBREGION. IN ADDITION, THIS MEETING SHOULD DETERMINE THE RESOURCE NEEDS FOR THE NEAR- AND LONG-TERM AND WHETHER OR NOT THEY CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE ON A TIMELY BASIS.

D. WFP/ROME SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO NAME IMMEDIATELY ONE OF ITS MORE SENIOR PERSONS AS FOOD SUPPLY COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE SITES WITHIN THE REGION. THIS PERSON WOULD HAVE AUTHORITY OVER INDIVIDUAL WFP COUNTRY DIRECTORS ON ALL MATTERS DEALING WITH SUPPLYING REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE SUBREGION WITH SUFFICIENT FOOD ON A TIMELY BASIS. AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN THIS JOB WOULD BE TO PREPARE AN UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE FOOD NEEDS FOR THE COMING YEAR AND POTENTIAL AVAILABLE SOURCES. A MAIN TASK OF THIS COORDINATOR WOULD BE TO ENSURE THE EFFICIENT FLOW OF COMMUNICATIONS AND EXERCISE OF MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN SHIFTING FOOD WITHIN THE SUBREGION AS PRIORITY DEMANDS DICTATE. UNHCR SHOULD ASSIGN A PERSON TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE WFP FOOD COORDINATOR AND UNHCR, IF NOT DONE ALREADY, SHOULD ALSO DESIGNATE AN OVERALL SUBREGIONAL COORDINATOR AS WELL AS SECTOR LEADERS IN SUCH AREAS AS WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, HEALTH/SANITATION, COOKING FUEL, SHELTER AND SITE SELECTION AND PLANNING. IN THIS LIGHT, THE ROLE OF UNREO NEEDS TO BE REEXAMINED.

E. USAID/WASHINGTON, PRM AND OTHER USG AGENCIES INVOLVED SHOULD CONSIDER REAPPRAISING THEIRS ROLES AND CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE LONG HAUL AND INFORM QUICKLY CONCERNED COUNTRY MISSIONS OF THE RESULTS OF THIS APPRAISAL. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL THAT THE USG ALSO HAVE ONE OVERALL COORDINATOR. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE MISSION TO KNOW SOON WHAT FOOD AND NON-FOOD RESOURCES THE USG WILL BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN FY 1995. KNOWING ABOUT AVAILABLE PL 480 FOOD COMMODITIES IS PARTICULARLY URGENT. THE MISSION WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE KNOWING, PARTICULARLY AS IT MAY EFFECT THE TANZANIAN SIDE OF THE REFUGEE PUZZLE, THE PLANNED ROLE FOR THE VARIOUS DART TEAMS. IN THIS REGARD, MISSION IS PREPARED TO PLAY, WITH MINIMAL ADDITIONAL SUPPORT, A GREATER ROLE IN MONITORING AND REPORTING ON THE REFUGEE SITUATION. MISSION ALSO OPEN TO CARRYING OUT APPROPRIATE DEMARCHES WITH THE GOT ON THIS SUBJECT. A FIRST DEMARCHE MIGHT BE TO ENCOURAGE THE GOT TO PROVIDE MORE LAND FOR REFUGEE SITES AND RESETTLEMENT. BUT, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LIKELY REPLY FROM THE GOT WILL BE TO RECEIVE SOMETHING IN RETURN FOR ITS HELP IN THIS REGARD.

MISSION FOLLOW-UP: THERE IS MUCH WORK IN THE
MINDBOGGLING DETAILS

12. THE MISSION TAKES VERY SERIOUS ITS JOB OF DOING ITS PART IN FOLLOWING UP ON THE MANY DETAILS INVOLVED IN PROVIDING ALL THE SUPPORT IT CAN TO THE HRO'S WORKING IN THE KAGERA REGION AND, ACCORDINGLY, IN THE DAYS AHEAD WILL BE SENDING SEPARATE MESSAGES, FORMAL AND INFORMAL, TO THOSE WHO MAY WANT MORE DETAILS AND WHO MAY BE ABLE TO HELP IN SUCH AREAS AS FOOD AND WATER SUPPLY, SHELTER, SECURITY, ETC. AT THE SAME TIME, MISSION WELCOMES REACTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. MISSION WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION AND REPORT AS APPROPRIATE. USAID WILL CONTINUE TO REMAIN IN ALMOST CONSTANT TOUCH WITH OFDA/DART TEAMS IN KIGALI AND NAIROBI AND RELEVANT PFP OFFICES, PROVIDING THEM WITH UPDATED INFORMATION ON A REGULAR BASIS. TO THIS END, USAID/DAR IS CONSIDERING FILLING AN OPEN USPSC SLOT WITH A LOCAL HIRE PERSON TO IMPROVE COVERAGE OF ISSUES RELATED TO THE REFUGEES AND FOOD SECURITY IN TANZANIA.

CONCLUSION: CHANCES FOR PREVENTING A "PERMANENT" REFUGEE
CRISIS AND MORE CHAOS ARE GROWING SLIMMER

13. PREVENTING EVEN MORE DEATHS AND HUMAN SUFFERING IN THE KAGERA REGION REFUGEE CAMPS WILL BE A HUGE TEST OF THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO CONTINUE APPLYING THE AMOUNT OF TIME AND RESOURCES THAT CONTROLLING THIS ONGOING CRISIS REQUIRES. ALREADY THERE ARE SIGNS OF COMPASSION FATIGUE AND THE INABILITY OF DONORS TO PROVIDE NEEDED RESOURCES (ESTIMATED VALUE DOLS 15 TO 20 MILLION PER MONTH). THE DEMANDS IMPOSED ON DONORS BY A MULTITUDE OF DISASTER SITUATIONS IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD MAKE IT HARDER FOR THE TANZANIAN PART OF THE RWANDA/BURUNDI REFUGEE CRISIS TO GET THE ATTENTION IT NEEDS TO AVOID A WORSENING OF THE SITUATION IN THE KAGERA REGION. UNFORTUNATELY, IT MAY TAKE A WORSENING OF THE SITUATION AND A RESULTING INCREASE IN MEDIA COVERAGE BEFORE SUFFICIENT ATTENTION IS FORTHCOMING. HOPEFULLY, THIS WILL NOT BE THE CASE AND THIS MESSAGE WILL LEND ITSELF TO TRIGGERING EFFORTS TO REVERSE THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE KAGERA

CAMPS AND ELSEWHERE IN THE SUBREGION.

14. CLEARLY, AS ADVISED IN REF A, THE DIRE REFUGEE CONDITIONS NOW PREVAILING IN THE KAGERA CAMPS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED WITH THE TIMELY ARRIVAL OF APPROPRIATE AND SUFFICIENT RESOURCES AND THE ACQUISITION OF SUITABLE NEW CAMP SITES. A HIGHER LEVEL OF EFFORT AND ATTENTION WILL BE REQUIRED TO AVOID A CONTINUED DECLINING TREND IN REFUGEE CONDITIONS. SUCH A DECLINE COULD LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN DEATHS, A WIDENING OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY AND POLITICAL-MILITARY VOLATILITY. IF THOSE IN A POSITION TO MAKE DECISIONS WHICH COULD SOFTEN THIS DOWNWARD TREND DO NOT ACT NOW, THE SITUATION WILL BECOME EVEN MORE COMPLICATED AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE. THE INTRACTABILITY OF THIS PROTRACTED CIVIL STRIFE/REFUGEE CRISIS WILL ONLY DEEPEN IF NO MORE IS DONE NOW TO SET THE STAGE FOR AN EVENTUAL DURABLE SETTLEMENT.

15. BUJUMBURA, KIGALI AND LUANDA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ANDERSON ##